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ABSTRACT This article draws on two empirical case studies to draw out the way in which the
causes of poverty in austere times in the UK are inverted, from their socio-economic causes to
making the poor themselves responsible for their misery but also responsibilising them for
fighting their way out of poverty. We particularly focus on how austerity policy in the UK has
involved a return of moral language of the ‘undeserving poor’. We highlight the way in
which this ‘moral-political economy’ has gendered effects, targeting single-mothers and their
children and families, through the lens of ‘literacy’. The first case study show how promoting
‘financial literacy’ is seen to solve indebtedness of the poor and the second case study
highlights how ‘parental literacy’ is employed to turn around ‘troubled families’. Indeed,
these two studies demonstrate how the morality of austerity is shaped through deeply
gendered practices of the everyday in which women’s morality is what ultimately needs
reforming.
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Introduction
The politics of austerity dominate contemporary discussions of the British economy. Every new
set of economic figures published sparks another debate on whether the UK has finally recovered
(Hutton, 2014; Parker, 2014). The sheer variety of opinions demonstrates the inability to discern
whether the UK is moving out of—or into—a prolonged stagnation (Crouch, 2011; Hay, 2013;
Sum & Jessop, 2013). It is problematic to ‘spin’ new sets of economic growth figures in order to
support or oppose austerity as a policy agenda. Yet, it is even more problematic to accept that the
policy-elite are locked into a politics of uneven reform that targets households as objects and
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subjects of ‘reform’ in order to continue not ‘reforming’ the structural problems of financialised
growth. ‘Economic growth’ acts as a framing device in which highly stylised figures reporting
positive economic performance serves to silence alternative voices for whom economic priori-
ties mean something else entirely (Ferber & Nelson, 2003; Hoskyns & Rai, 2007; Stiglitz, Sen, &
Fitoussi, 2009; Young, Bakker, & Elson, 2011).
This article explores how uneven reform is underwritten by austerity-led policies that develop
a new policy language of ‘improving literacy’—inscribing a lack of education, skills and moral
norms (not the economy) as a fundamental cause of contemporary poverty in the UK. Thereby,
we are shifting the terrain of how to understand and investigate austerity away from a focus on
economic performance to grasping the deeply moral way in which policy-making seeks to
manage and control households’ everyday social reproduction under the auspices of ‘Austerity
Britain’. We offer two detailed case studies of public policies that seek to reform individuals in
order to solve the problems of the economy. Qualitative evidence is used to argue that successive
packages of welfare reform forces austerity into the spaces of the everyday, which reconstitutes
the gendered experience of poverty and indebtedness in Britain. While in practice these are two
discrete case studies designed and carried out independently of one another—that is, they do not
share a common research question or any common participants, making them different in terms
of the object and subject of analysis—what is most striking is the similarity of the results. Both
case studies highlight how welfare reform ensures that public policy touches down on the lives of
ordinary people, allowing us to empirically investigate the ways in which households’ social
reproduction is challenged and sustained through everyday gendered practices. It is this com-
monality of themes and issues that we analyse closely in this article.
Theoretically, this article speaks to the growing literature that explores austerity as a political
agenda that enforces cultural processes of self-reliance and resilience (Bramall, 2013; Stanley,
2014). Our research is further informed by the large and growing body of feminist political
economy literature investigating the way in which policy under neoliberalism seeks to shape
processes of social reproduction (Bakker & Silvey, 2008; Bezanson & Luxton, 2006;
LeBaron, 2010; Luxton & Braedley, 2010; Steans & Tepe, 2010). We seek to add to this litera-
ture with detailed qualitative research of how austerity in Britain is concomitantly enacted and
resisted through the public policy process. Most importantly, we make visible the ways in which
notions of ‘morality’ are simultaneously conjured and silenced to justify public policy. As such,
we would talk about a feminist moral-political economy framework guiding our research. We
point towards the gendered construction of such claims and processes. For example, poor
indebted households need to exercise prudence and temperance while high-cost lenders do
not. Similarly, ‘Troubled Families’ need to ‘take responsibility’ for their situation and turn
their lives around while policy-makers do not take responsibility for their failures to turn
around the economy in which these families must live. Moral virtue and vice offers a different
perspective on how policy is deliberately obscured in contemporary Great Britain (Crouch,
2011; Hay, 2013).
More specifically, we critically interrogate how morality permits at the same time as it cloaks
a re-imaging of poverty as an inherently moral condition; therefore, a person is not poor because
of the material conditions they encounter in a depressed economy, rather poverty is the outcome
of a lack of moral virtues of hard work and prudence with the added neoliberal virtue of respon-
sibility for self. In policy terms, these virtues become actionable as educational deficiencies;
therefore the poor require (re)education—further literacy—in these key moral virtues
because they lack these fundamental skills. Yet, while the concept of financial literacy is a
well-established policy term, the concept of parental literacy, apart from being a well-
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established practice, is not commonly used. This article highlights the ways in which acquiring
literacy describes a process of learning skills that are considered morally superior, thus being
more than just education and/or discipline. Indeed, policy-makers mobilise morality to question,
discipline and potentially even criminalise the everyday practices of social reproduction in poor
families. We provide the evidence to support this claim using two case studies: promoting finan-
cial literacy to solve indebtedness of the poor and parental literacy to turn around ‘troubled’
families. The two studies demonstrate how the morality of austerity is shaped through deeply
gendered practices of the everyday in which women’s morality is ultimately what needs reform-
ing. We show how poor women, especially those with dependent children, are the main objects/
subjects of austerity-led reforms that seek to transform their undesirable (moral) behaviours with
new forms of literacy, that is, financial literacy and parental literacy programmes.
Case Study I: Indebtedness and the Moral Vulnerability of the Poor
The first case study explores the on-going efforts to reform the high-cost consumer credit (i.e.
payday and doorstep lending) industry and how the problems of this industry are recast in
policy terms of the moral vulnerability of the poor, especially women and children. In particular,
by promoting financial literacy and improving affordability checks by lenders, which essentially
permits greater rationing of credit to lower-income groups. This case study reveals how a reform
agenda materialises: growing rates of poverty and credit rationing create conditions that allow
the high-cost credit industry to flourish. While there is widespread mobilisation for reform,
these attempts are transformed into claims about the importance of greater financial literacy
to combat payday and doorstep lending. In other words, knowing how to calculate the annual
percentage rate (APR) on a loan is framed by policy-makers as the key skill needed to protect
against the excesses of payday, and other high-cost, lenders. Drawing on evidence from semi-
structured interviews from financial reform campaigners that details their experience of advocat-
ing for reforms with policy-makers at all levels reveals why substantive reform of retail banking
is so elusive in the UK (Communities & Culture Network, 2014).
Beginning with the reality that finance is gendered and the resulting inequalities are manifest in
debt relations (Griffin, 2013; Walby, 2009; Young, 2013), we can then move on to the debt as a
safety-net: a well-recognised feature of the type of financialised growth UK policy-makers
promote (Gibbons, 2014; Montgomerie, 2013, 2014b). In practical terms, 70% of people go into
debt because they are either hit by an unexpected emergency (e.g. job loss or medical illness) or
because they need to buy something unexpectedly (Traub & Ruetschlin, 2012, pp. 8–9). Welfare
reform in the UK involves downloading public expenditure onto households; each new round of
‘reforms’ coupled with flexible labour markets and stagnating wages means that the social repro-
duction of households requires evermore debt to sustain itself. For example, the Coalition govern-
ment’s welfare reform package is directly linked to rising debt levels of families piloted for the
Bedroom Tax and Universal Credit; in short, these policies effectively forced participating
families to take out high-cost short-term credit to make up the shortfall from benefits (Banks,
Brown, Flaherty, Herrington, & Waters, 2013). This builds on a growing amount of research
that exposes the direct links between rising debt with falling welfare provisions; ultimately,
private high-cost debt directly substitutes public spending (Gibbons, 2014; Packman, 2012).
The UK’s main financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), published a report
in 2014 on Consumer credit and consumers in vulnerable circumstances. It focused principally
on imposing an interest rate cap on high-cost ‘payday’ lenders at the same time as it advanced a
policy framework for evaluating high-cost borrowers as ‘vulnerable’. Deploying key
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assumptions from behavioural economics, the report developed a vulnerability framework based
on key behavioural traits that are used to assess the ways in which the debtors are, ultimately, the
cause of their own indebtedness. Financial regulators frame debt as a basic contract between a
creditor and debtor, at an agreed interest rate over an agreed period; therefore if high-cost credit
providers are subject to new regulation, so too should high-cost borrowers, specifically with
better financial literacy skills. Framing the cause of debt problems as rooted in a lack of literacy
and numeracy skills locates the ‘problem’ of high-cost loans with the borrower—not a flawed
market or defunct financial products. Behavioural economic frames of ‘debt denial’ and ‘avoid-
ance’ of problem debt levels pathologies debt as a psychological deficiency; while high-cost
lenders are not subjected to similar forms of analysis. It seems the FCA is more comfortable ana-
lysing what makes debtors (so irrational they) take out payday loan than it is analysing what be-
havioural traits induce lenders to charge extortionate interest rates, raid debtors bank accounts
and engage in psychological harassment to collect debts (Deville, 2015; Packman, 2012). The
FCA calls to build better financial capability among high-cost borrowers involves improving
numerical literacy levels, which in and of themselves are rather benign; however, what is
more pernicious is a financial regulator that completely ignores the widely acknowledged exter-
nal economic forces directly contributing to rising debt levels—light touch regulation of retail
banking.
In this context, vulnerability is made into a regulatory tool to identify social groups and com-
munities in special need of regulatory intervention (Atkinson, McKay, & Kempson, 2006;
Atkinson & Messy, 2012). Financial literacy education (FLE) is a coordinated policy objective
developed at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
adopted in the UK, which, according to Clarke (2015), creates an ‘irreconcilable gap’
between the empowerment discourse of financial literacy for ordinary people and the actual
success of ordinary people in achieving security and well-being through financial markets (p.
258). Moreover, state-sponsored financial literacy programmes naturalise highly gendered
form of financial knowledge and expertise. Zokaityte’s (in press) detailed analysis of the
OECD’s financial literacy survey clearly demonstrated how:
thinking about gender inequalities in financial markets through the literacy/illiteracy boundary intro-
duces limitations to understanding the complex environment and processes which shape and produce
inequalities in the financial market. Yet more importantly, by misattributing gender inequalities to
illiterate financial decision-making, the measure participates in the further marginalisation of
women, lower-income earners, ethnic minority groups, and migrants in financial markets.
The institutional ethos of the OECD and the FCA seek to neutralise society in a way that makes
visible their belief in the neutrality of markets.
In this context, civil society actors deploy everyday social reproduction to destabilise public
policy assumptions that individualise debt as a credit contract between a borrower and a lender.
This starting point recasts financial reform in terms of greater efforts to promote responsible
credit (interest rate cap, affordability checks, mis-selling) for lenders and/or better financial lit-
eracy for borrowers. This particular reform agenda materialised as increasing poverty rates met
credit rationing by high street banks after 2008. These conditions allow the high-cost credit
industry to flourish with civil society campaigns mobilising to combat this in a variety of
ways (Montgomerie, 2014a).
Interesting is how the market neutrality assumption and policy-fix recipe for measuring pol-
itical success is continually challenged and subverted by the civil society participants in their
engagement with actors directly responsible for regulatory change. Importantly, this is
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accomplished primarily by mobilising morality and family-care responsibilities as evidence that
‘the market’ creates (not reflects) inequality and that debt is a form of poverty that requires more
than better financial regulation to solve. In other words, these civil society participants recognise
key feminist political economy concepts and use them in interesting ways to destabilise estab-
lished knowledge about finance and its role in the economy. For example, many faith-based
community groups articulate debt power relations in terms of the responsibility of lenders,
not just borrowers. Concepts such as usury or loan sharking anchor credit practices in social
and moral terms.
The household and everyday social reproduction, much more than market and commerce,
anchor and make sense of the general idea that policy has got it all wrong when it comes to
understanding how indebtedness shapes the wider economy. In more practical terms, it is
obvious that the most effective policy to curb payday lending is to improve welfare provisions
for Britain’s urban poor; however, this proves politically impossible. Civil society groups con-
tinuously reshape their intervention into the debates about the impact of indebtedness by focus-
ing on the everyday experiences of the people they engage with.
In the household that’s got children, over December and January everybody talks about ‘they’re just
spending money on presents for Christmas’. What they’re not taking in to account is that in those
households, the kids are off school for two weeks, so they’re not getting school meals. Electricity
meter is needed far more often and the whole household is just under pressure at that time. The
impact of that isn’t just on that woman, because her first reaction is not ‘great, I’m gonna go and
blow it on a night at the bingo’, no matter what our politicians think. Her first reaction is ‘oh
God, I can go shopping and get some things. We can have a good Christmas’. (Credit Union worker)
Individuals providing services to those struggling with their debts know what policy-makers fail
to acknowledge: debt is much more than a credit contract (Soederberg, 2014). Here, civil society
deploys feminist political economy understandings of the economy, in particular around care
and the family to politicise debt. Care is used to rupture understandings of debt as simply
about banking or finance and linking it to wider economic issues. This is evident in the multiple
ways debt is narrated as a ‘family issue’ in the sense that financial burdens and distress affect the
entire household not just the person named on the credit contract. The everyday social reproduc-
tion of indebtedness in families is deeply gendered and directly related to the monetary and
social costs of care provision within households. Framing debt in terms of care reveals the
important gendered practices that shape the contemporary feminisation of poverty in contempor-
ary Britain.
[the] story of a grandmother whose granddaughter had got in to £2000 worth of debt through Wonga
and she’d had to use money that she was saving for her husband’s funeral, to spend on that, that she
had to spend on paying off her granddaughter’s debt. So you know, very powerful story, able to
capture what is going wrong in her community. (Community organiser)
Faith-based organisations command the language of morality and family more easily than
secular policy-focused organisations; recent reports such as God and the money lenders and
The debt trap: End the damage to children (Children’s Society, 2014) demonstrate how
faith-based civil society groups challenge the market morality. Church-based community organ-
isations seek to create a space for people to offer ‘testimony’ (in this case to testify is also
ecclesiastical practice) on how debt impacts their everyday life. Secular community-groups
replicate this testimony model in a public meeting-style. In both instances, the effort is to put
the human experience of debt centre stage; in doing so, community organisers identify compel-
ling family stories that anchor their political action.
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Personal stories are meaningful ways of unpacking the power relations constituting debt and
show how family debts shape everyday practices of social reproduction. Community organisers
from across the UK have taken up the issue of high-cost credit and indebtedness among poor
communities; they explicitly focus on providing a platform to share personal stories of families
struggling with debt. For example, the ‘Money Talks’ Campaign invited church groups to speak
openly about money and debt problems in a community setting. This later-spawned Shark Stop-
pers initiative sought combat payday lending shops taking over high streets in deprived neigh-
bourhoods by empowering local residents and church congregations to act locally. The deeply
problematic practice of high-cost lenders in poor communities becomes a public issue. For
instance, cases of debt collectors chasing family members for payment are well documented,
though change is not forthcoming in terms of policy or regulatory action to curb them.
Rather, regulatory changes to address high-cost lending in poor communities have cultivated a
new narrative of ‘vulnerability’ to frame policy. This ultimately justifies better financial literacy
as an actionable policy response that requires no public investment and limited expenditure. This
recasts debt as essentially about mathematical skills related to calculating interest rates or mana-
ging a budget. Significantly, this completely ignores the widely acknowledged causes of rising
household debt: stagnating wages, deregulated financial services and welfare reform. In this
context, austerity policies continue apace in the UK, and the degree to which policy was justified
and evaluated in moral terms becomes increasingly clear.
The real problem here is that there has been an attempt to suggest that the personal debt crisis has
come about because people aren’t prudent people. Dr. Richard Wellings, from the Institute for Econ-
omic Affairs, told me that there wouldn’t be such a thing as a payday lending industry if poorer
people were more prudent. Those words! I think that there are a great many people, very important
people in government, that think that’s true as well. (Civil society expert on payday lending)
Framing indebtedness as a form of vulnerability that can be addressed with better financial lit-
eracy exposes a wider morality that justifies current welfare reform efforts and shapes govern-
ment inaction on indebtedness. Civil society groups and individual actors contest the market
morality of politicians and policy-makers in different yet complementing ways. Through
these forms of non-state political activities, civil society cultivates a deep socio-cultural distrust
of attempts to cast debt as a personal failing, be it lack of educational attainment or moral traits
such as prudence or temperance. By engaging directly with indebted communities—from debt
advice services to church-based ‘Money Talks’, civil society creates a political space to articu-
late the deeply gendered inequalities of indebtedness.
Case Study II: Troubled Families Need Parental Literacy
The second case is an in-depth study of the Troubled Families Programme (TFP) in two Northern
locales. It shows the framing of social, not economic, decay as the cause of poverty. The TFP
offers a set of proposals that expose the everyday experiences of women, in particular single
mothers, and how social policy does not (and should not according to the Secretary of State
in charge of this programme) deem poor women as deserving of welfare provision. The TFP
seeks to remedy the problems of urban poverty and lack of social provisioning for families
with better ‘parental literacy’. In-depth interviews with 10 key policy-makers and care
workers in each locale that implement TFP reveal the degree to which women and children
become the objects of reform and how policy-makers internalise the objective to ‘turn
around’ their lives through direct state intervention.
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The TFP is one of the flagship programmes of the Coalition Government to tackle Broken
Britain (Tepe-Belfrage, 2015). In Cameron’s words:
I want to talk about troubled families. Let me be clear what I mean by this phrase. Officialdom might
call them ‘families with multiple disadvantages’. Some in the press might call them ‘neighbours
from hell’. Whatever you call them, we’ve known for years that a relatively small number of families
are a source of a large proportion of the problems in society. Drug addiction. Alcohol abuse. Crime.
A culture of disruption and irresponsibility that cascades through generations. We’ve always known
that these families cost an extraordinary amount of money . . . . (Cameron, 2011)
The TFP seeks to ‘turn around’ the lives of what was originally claimed to be 120,000 but was
recently revised to 500,000 families in the UK by 2015 (Wintour, 2014).
The primary justification for this policy is to reduce the costs to public finances, estimated at
£75,000 per year per ‘Troubled Family’ or £30 billion in total estimated direct costs and services
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013a). These figures are hotly contested
and come with very little by way of verifiable audit trail (Levitas, 2012). According to the 2013
governmental report ‘The Costs of Troubled Families’:
We spend disproportionately more on troubled families than the ‘average’ family. For example, in
West Cheshire, the council is spending an average of £7795 on an average family in its area, com-
pared to £76,190 for a troubled family. In Solihull, local services spend an average of £5217 on an
average family, compared with £46,217 on a troubled family. The amount spent on a troubled family
is estimated at nearly £100,000 in Barnet. This is not sustainable. (Department for Communities and
Local Government, 2013b, p. 5)
Problematically, the implementation of the TFP is marked by the absence of consistency in the
working definition of who qualifies as a ‘Troubled Family’—and the very concept of being
‘troubled’ remains largely undefined. The initial scoping study defined and categorised a
‘Troubled Family’ as meeting five out of seven criteria: having a low income, no one in the
family who is working, poor housing, parents who have no qualifications, where the mother
has a mental health problem, one parent has a long-standing illness or disability, and where
the family is unable to afford basics, including food and clothes (National Audit Office,
2013b, p. 16). However, it became clear that many of the seven are beyond the control of the
families themselves. In 2012 a guide to the evidence and good practice of working with troubled
families defined Troubled Families as meeting three out of four criteria: involved in youth crime
or anti-social behaviour (ASB), have children who are regularly truanting or not in school, have
an adult on out of work benefits and cause high costs to the taxpayer (Department for Commu-
nities and Local Government, 2012). This seems to also be the definition of a Troubled Family
for the new phase of the programme (Department of Communities and Local Government,
2014a) surprisingly given the proclaimed focus on mental health of this phase of the programme.
According to government figures, families in the ‘Troubled Families’ Programme face an
average of nine serious problems (Department for Communities and Local Government,
2014a, p. 4). Against the background of a lack of an exact definition of what constitutes a
‘Troubled Family’, the TFP is set up using a ‘pay for performance’ model from national govern-
ment to Local Authorities. Phase one of the TFP (until 2015) pays local authorities £2000 for
every family that signs up and an additional £4000 for ‘turning around’ the lives of participating
families. The programme encourages councils to appoint dedicated case-workers to individual
‘failing’ families helping them to change their lives. A family is considered to be officially
‘turned around’ when:
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each child in the family has had fewer than three fixed exclusions (from school) and unauthorised
absences on no more than 15% of schooldays, in the last three terms; as well as a 60% reduction
in anti-social behaviour across the family in six months. In addition, the offending rate by all
minors in the family must have fallen by at least a third in the same period. (Wintour, 2013)
Phase two of the TFP (which began late 2014) focuses on the 51 best performing areas to be
followed by a national 5-year programme from 2015 (Department for Communities and Local
Government, 2014b). The new phase of the programme aims to particularly focus on poor health
as, according to government data, 71% of the troubled families have physical and 46% mental
health concerns (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2014a, p. 4), at the same
time as tackling ASB and getting parents (mostly single-mothers) into regular paid employment.
The culture of austerity (Bramall, 2013) shapes how the TFP is implemented but it is an inten-
sification of New Labour’s focus on family intervention as the solution to tackling ASB more
widely. ASB orders are arguably the quintessential example of policy-making without empirical
evidence on the nature and extent of a problem and a crucial cornerstone of New Labour’s crime
and disorder policy (Parr, 2011, p. 718). Here, as in the TFP, parental irresponsibility is identified
as the root underlying cause of ASB rather than, for example, different families exposure to poor
housing or poverty.
In fact, quite the opposite is true, the TFP takes up New Labour’s focus on parenting skills as
actionable behaviours that can be addressed to solve almost everything from poverty, social
exclusion, crime, and ASB to poor health (Moran, Ghate, & van der Merwe, 2004). Steps
towards addressing poor parenting through government-funded family support intervention
under New Labour included the establishment of a range of parenting programmes, for
example, the appointment of parenting ‘experts’ in 77 areas across England as well as the
launch of a National Academy for Parenting Practitioners (Parr, 2011, p. 719). At the same
time, the criminal justice system was readjusting to provide the backstop to state intervention
in parenting—with the courts being given new authority to clamp down on parental irresponsi-
bility including, among others, the Parenting Order (1998) requiring parents to attend parenting
classes or counselling at threat of fines or even prison.
Intensive family support has become national policy if not before than certainly under New
Labour’s Respect Action Plan in 2006, leading towards ‘the establishment of a national
network of Family Intervention Projects’ (Parr, 2011, p. 720).
The continuation from New Labour’s family policy to the TFP is thus visible in policy terms
but it also a continuity of management. The head of the national TFP strategy Louise Casey was
heading the Anti-Social Behaviour Unit at the Home Office from 2003 and was appointment the
head of the Respect Task Force in 2006, which was crucially designed by New Labour to tackle
problematic young people’s behaviour and to support their parents into taking responsibility for
the impact of their children’s behaviour (Burney, 2009, pp. 46–47).
Yet, New Labour’s focus on good parenting as a route to societal development went beyond
the focus on tackling ASB. It was accompanied by early intervention and childhood initiatives.
Sure Start Centres, Health in Pregnancy Grants, more expensive school meals, etc. were
designed to work hand-in-hand with Family Intervention Programmes of different sorts and
intensities. Family Intervention in austere times under the Coalition government has diverted
from these important ‘support’ mechanisms that were under New Labour considered crucial
to deliver successful Family policies. As such, the TFP sits firmly within the discourse and prac-
tice of Family Intervention as established under New Labour, particularly focusing on the idea
that effective and socially responsible parenting will help to overcome societal shortcomings.
The absence of ‘parental literacy’ is, as was under New Labour, identified as the cause of
8 J. Montgomerie & D. Tepe-Belfrage
‘trouble’. Yet, the current TFP focus on parental literacy moves away from tackling socio-econ-
omic causes of poverty and ASB to substitute social policy with literacy programmes based on
what is deemed morally superior. Welfare cuts have particularly hit those institutions that aimed
at embedding Family Intervention into a wider safety-net of early intervention. The widespread
closure of Sure Start Centres throughout the country can serve as an example. As such, we argue
that parental literacy has been given an even more prominent role under the Coalition Govern-
ment in tackling what is perceived as root causes of societal problems. This is also where this
case study connects to the previous one. Increasing literacy serves in both instances as a
morally charged substitute to excuse government from supporting actual material change to
poor people’s lives.
Detailed qualitative research into the adoption and implementation of the TFP in 2 locales and
nationally involving, to date, 12 interviews with policy-makers, managers of family intervention
practice and social workers are used to show how the programme is enacted at the national and
local level. Both locales are among the councils considered to have the most ‘Troubled Families’
in the UK (Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester, Essex, Lancashire, Kent, Bradford, Norfolk,
Bristol, and Nottingham), yet, at least from the outset, seem to be face very distinct struggles
given their demographics, especially regarding race.
The design of the interviews has reflected the implementation of the TFP. Given its ad-hoc,
largely uncoordinated nature among councils in the UK, the questions asked were open-
ended, fact finding rather than pre-structured. This more widely reflects feminists’ deep suspi-
cions against the problematic assumptions of conventional structured or semi-structured inter-
view techniques and sought to emphasise the perspectives of the interviewees in order to live
up to feminist’s desire ‘of involving the researched in the analysis of data’ (Sprague, 2005,
p. 143).
The findings as of today suggest that there are very limited data available on the composition
of the ‘Troubled Families’ in the UK. Freedom of information (FOI) requests to central govern-
ment and the ten councils for data on the racial and gender composition of the most ‘Troubled
Families’ have suggested that none, except Bradford, even collect data on the gender and racial
composition of these families. It is alarming that basic demographic information is not collated,
making it difficult to determine the extent to which single female-headed households with
dependent children are, in fact, more likely to be considered ‘troubled’. The fact that these stat-
istics are not being collated as part of the implementation and monitoring of TFP, with the excep-
tion of Birmingham City Council, which suggested that data might be available at a later date
(FOI made in February 2014), reveals a shocking lack of ‘evidence-based policy’. More shock-
ing is that politicians and policy-makers evoke the single-mother when laying blame; like when
Cameron (2011) claims absent fathers are a key reason families are ‘troubled’, thus implicating
how single-mothers are unable to cope—we know now he makes this claim without reliable data
to support it.
Despite the lack of reliable data, there seems to be a tendency, exposed in the discourse on
absent fathers, that single-mother households are significantly overrepresented among Britain’s
‘Troubled Families’. An indication of these families being largely single-mother households
seems to be that of the six case studies of troubled families compiled by the government, five
are headed by single-mothers (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2014c).
Indeed, interviews with Programme Directors of TFPs in the case study locales have confirmed,
although anecdotally, the overrepresentation of female-headed single parent households, with
one Director suggesting the number could be as high as 80%.
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A key finding from the initial phase of primary research is the common discourse running
through the very idea of the TFP: welfare provision per se is blamed for the situation in
which families find themselves, as apparently welfare provision causes a lack of aspirations
(Tepe-Belfrage & Montgomerie, in press). Welfare as the problem is echoed at the national
level to justify austerity as a force for good because it enables greater welfare cuts. This
marks a significant change in social policy objectives in which welfare provision was seen as
policy tool to combat wider social problems, not the cause of them.
But it’s also about linking them in and having them with aspirations, because we’ve found out part
and parcel of the culture in . . . is that people have been in a benefit culture and we’ve worked with
third-, fourth-generation and beyond of all being in benefits, and there are certain pockets of this city
that are the most deprived or have been the most deprived in Europe, and therefore those people have
no aspirations whatsoever. (Programme Director)
But we have, I think, a large number of single parents, predominantly women, who are the carers for
the children, but I think that’s something that’s been supported by the legislation and the benefits
system and by, as I say, housing, because go back a few years ago and the housing associations
were actually told, don’t bother building any one- or two-bedrooms, make them three-bedroom
accommodation. So that supports women and children being in a home, does it? (Case worker)
In this context, parental and life choices of welfare recipients are questioned from the perceived
‘moral high ground’ of bureaucrats seeking to reform them. Throughout the interviews, partici-
pants routinely framed the problem in terms of the parental choices of the families deemed to be
‘troubled’ as morally wrong and, more generally, that the poor and welfare dependent do not
have an ability to evaluate the morality of their choices—that they lack the parental literacy
to make such choices. One case worker, for example, highlighted what she perceived as a
morally problematic way of spending money, criticising that . . .
. . . there is a culture in the poor areas to demonstrate and evidence your love for your children by
buying them the latest things, so they might not have any money at all but they get in to a couple
of years’ debt to buy the latest X-Box or the latest mobile phone because that’s cool.
Similarly, a programme manager pointed to what she/he perceived as morally problematic
relationships where fathers are not taking responsibility for their children and family, and
women choosing to have children with several different partners,
So there’ll be three different surnames of those children who are siblings, so there will be males who
come and go . . . there hasn’t been the accountability and fathers have come and gone as they’ve so
chosen without taking on-board that responsibility.
In order to get the morally wrong poor to accept new frameworks of reference for parenting and
to fulfil wider societal norms, disciplining even criminalising practices are widely accepted and
perceived as right. It was largely believed that the need to provide parental literacy to these
parents was so crucial that it legitimises these measures. Indeed, threatening families into par-
ticipation in the TFP seems to be a widespread practice, with social workers and programme
manager acknowledging the problems in getting families to accept being ‘supervised’ in the
first place.
We do have a bit of a problem with engagement. (Programme manager)
We have had quite a few (who did not want to cooperate, D.T-B.) and we’re looking at kind of, how
we get across to them the consequences of not engaging and what might happen in the future. And
that’s not to say it’s a threat to them, it’s a reality, really. If they carry on down this road, their chil-
dren may end up in prison or whatever, so it’s explaining the consequences to the family to try and
encourage them to engage. (Case worker)
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Indeed, while it is perfectly acceptable for everybody else in society to be wary of intervention
from authorities, the same argument is questioned when brought forward by ‘Troubled Families’
for their lack of engagement.
That they don’t like authority; they think they’ll deal with their own problems. They don’t like being
told what to do. They don’t like being . . . there’s just so many problems in that particular family’s
life that they see a FIP worker coming in as just an additional problem . . . . (Programme Director)
Indeed, this ‘infantilising of adults’ (Garrett, 2007, pp. 221–222) by questioning the moral integ-
rity of their choices, is also highlighted by not telling the involved families that they are con-
sidered and called ‘troubled’ when signing up to the programme. Rather, as has been
confirmed by interviewees, the families are approached and offered extra help without disclosure
of information about why they are offered this help. Nor are they informed that they meet the
criterion that allows the government (and potentially the wider public) to call them ‘Troubled
Families’. Yet, especially among social workers and case-workers, what is recognised is that
the material resources for families in need to make their life better are largely absent:
I mean, you’ve come in to the city centre now, you’ve got lots and lots of resources for families late
at night, but you can go to certain areas in this city and there won’t be a bank, there won’t be a shop,
there won’t be anything that’s a resource for a family. Because those sort of businesses have pulled
out because people haven’t got money to spend on a day-to-day basis. And that’s quite dramatic, for
a family. The basics for managing family life are not around them. (Case worker)
What became obvious in this research thus was the way in which policy was, just as in the pre-
vious case study, justified in moral terms. Furthermore, despite widespread insights that the dif-
ficulties the families in the programme faced (such as poverty, lack of infrastructure, bad and
health impacting housing, etc.) are largely beyond their own control, the idea that parental lit-
eracy would solve these problems has become ingrained in the discourses surrounding the TFP.
The Moral Economy of Reform
Contemporary depictions of austerity suggest a rational policy programme of fiscal reform that
reduces governmental spending and, ultimately public debts, albeit at some unknown date in the
medium-term future. Blyth (2013) details how austerity is a ‘dangerous idea’ deployed at differ-
ent times and in different contexts, as a means of providing political elites with a ready-made
platform to execute their political will. Bramall’s rejoinder (2013, p. 13) details how austerity
in Britain is a ‘complex ideological phenomenon’ that enables and reproduces cultural and
fiscal policies (see also, Davies & O’Callaghan, 2014, p. 227). Our research further develops cul-
tural political economy understandings of austerity by showing how the moral economy of
reform is articulated in austerity-led public policies. On the one hand, the lack of public
policy programme to deal with the ‘troubles’ caused by indebtedness in the UK is juxtaposed
with the TFP which explicitly seeks greater control over the everyday social reproduction of
households as a means to directly manage the lives of people, on the other.
Analysing these two case studies side-by-side reveals how austerity is at once evoked and silenced
in order to meet the specific political goal of welfare reform. In the first case study, rising use of high-
cost credit and subsequent indebtedness of poor urban communities is directly related to austerity-led
reductions in welfare provision for poor families (Banks et al., 2013). Therefore, we can credibly say
that austerity causes greater indebtedness among low-income families. The policy (non-)response is
that poor families need greater financial literacy, the ability to better calculate loan agreements so
that they understand the debt they are taking on. In the second case study, we see how ‘Troubled
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Families’ are framed as the cause of excessive welfare spending and, therefore, warrant a compre-
hensive policy package of direct government intervention, most interestingly under the auspice of
improving parental literacy. In both cases, ‘literacy’ is the device that enables key public policy fail-
ures to be re-imagined as flaws in individuals or families.
What is more, the framing of literacy as a policy device makes visible the moral economy of
reform that casts poverty as an inferior moral, not material, condition. It is only the ignorant that
require greater literacy. The growing legions of indebted households lack prudence and temper-
ance while ‘Troubled Families’ are cast deviant, anti-social and morally corrupt. Concepts such
as anti-socialness, deviance and/or moral corruption are invoked and inscribed on women as the
ultimate source of family problems, be they financial or otherwise. Again, it is mostly single
(unmarried) mothers who are targets here and as we see form the evidence using high-cost
credit to support their families. When policy-makers offer ‘literacy’ as a policy solution,
women become (once again) ignorant and vulnerable beings in need of intervention. Here,
the ‘nanny state’ takes on a different meaning where the ‘infantilising of adults’ entails
casting women’s behaviour as deemed in need of modification in order to limit public expendi-
ture. In one case it is about reducing what are perceived as the drain on the public purse caused
by ‘Troubled Families’ and their lifestyles, in the other case policy-makers are avoiding having
to provide any investment or services to the indebted.
At this juncture Sayer’s (2000, p. 80) example of the analytical method of operationalising
moral economy is most useful:
the study of the ways in which economic activities, in the broad sense, are influenced by moral-pol-
itical norms and sentiments, and how, conversely, those norms are compromised by economic
forces; so much so in some cases that the norms represent little more than legitimations of entrenched
power relations.
In our two case studies of the unevenness of reform policy interventions, we exposed the entrenched
power relations in which the state wishes to eliminate its services to citizens via the welfare state rather
than dealing with the underlying socio-economic causes of poverty and deprivation. By doing so,
policy-makers implicitly and explicitly endorse continued unequal access to affordable and decent
housing, income inequality, class difference, misogyny and sexism, racism, unequal access education
and health care. This becomes legitimate by casting poor families as lacking of essential skills to live
in the world. This is determined by isolating key behavioural traits, a lack of financial literacy (in the
case of indebted households) and a lack parental literacy (in the case of ‘Troubled Families’) as causes
of societal and economic decline. A simple counter-argument would be that: poor women with chil-
dren exhibit substantial survival skills in managing family budgets in the face of credit rationing, cost-
of-living crisis and economic stagnation. Similarly, that ‘Troubled Families’ are examples of how
addiction and mental health problems are still woefully under-serviced by social policy provision
and thus causing untold ‘trouble’ to local communities.
Such a move enables ignorance towards the socio-economic causes of poverty let alone
finding any sustainable solution to make the lives of the poor materially any better and/or
more equal. Indeed, as our research shows, such policies invert the causes of poverty. These
moves allow the framing of poverty as a moral not a material condition—allowing for discourses
such as the ‘absence of aspirations leading to social decline’ obscures the underlying socio-econ-
omic causes. These case studies highlight how a moral economy framework makes visible the
everyday practices of social reproduction by connecting different layers of analysis to individual
agency, institutionalised structures of community and family, not to mention the power of policy
work within the political economy.
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Conclusion
By way of conclusion, we want to reassert the need for an everyday economy lens to interrogate
Austerity Britain. Employing such a lens, we have investigated how poverty is framed as a moral
condition and how the poor are targeted to acquire new skills and greater literacy to overcome
this condition. We have drawn on two distinct case studies to substantiate this claim: one looking
at the way in which financial literacy is considered to solve indebtedness problems and one
looking at how parental literacy is seen as a route out of trouble for families. The cases highlight
how the cultural morality of austerity is deeply gendered and is challenging everyday practices
of social reproduction.
Attempts to understand the ongoing crisis of Austerity Britain as an interplay between
structural accounts of a crisis of capitalist accumulation and temporal dynamics that manifest
crisis fail to adequately consider the social and political content of ‘the economy’ that is (sup-
posedly) in crisis. Using a feminist moral-political economy lens to interpret the implemen-
tation of some reform agendas and not others allows us to interrogate more closely their
social content. More specifically, it allows us to examine how poor women, especially
those with dependent children, are objects/subjects of these reforms. The TFP offers a con-
crete set of proposals that expose the everyday experiences of women, in particular single-
mothers, and the changed perception that this group is no longer deemed deserving of
welfare provision. At the same time, payday loans and other forms of high-cost credit prolifer-
ate to service the poor, especially women with children, and there is little by way of reform or
regulation of the financial service providers in this market. Low-income families, especially
those headed by women, gained little in the boom years and are now expect to disproportio-
nately pay for the costs of recovery and fiscal consolidation. The failure to acknowledge the
fundamental way in which economic crisis are constituted through practices of social repro-
duction is no longer sufficient. Be they structural accounts of a crisis of capitalist accumu-
lation or conjunctural accounts that link financial crisis to a set of deregulatory practices in
financial markets—by not accounting for uneven social dynamics of economic is to comple-
tely misunderstand what kind of crisis this is.
Yet, these policies and the way in which women are becoming subjects of reform in austerity
Britain are not met without challenges, thus bearing hope for further initiatives of resistance. A
recent example is the ‘Focus E15 Mothers’: a group of young women with small children that
were targeted by the Newham local authority in Stratford, north-east London, for relocation
to council housing outside of London. Living in the Focus E15 hostel, these women were on
the council housing waiting lists for houses suitable for families with children, yet they were
effectively denied access to housing in their local community because, they were told, of auster-
ity measures. Under the banner ‘Social Housing, not Social Cleansing’, these women began a
campaign including regular street stalls and a social media campaign to resist relocation, empha-
sising that the move would mean the uprooting of family and support networks. Nevertheless,
until celebrity Russell Brand joined their squat in Carpenter’s Estate, a group of family-size
council houses deliberately closed by the council and earmarked for sale to private land devel-
opers, the groups were completely ignored by Newham Council. Although the group was evicted
from the four flats in Carpenter’s Estate in early October 2014, the ‘Focus E15Mothers’ have not
only been a vocal force in the current housing controversy in London, but following in the foot-
steps of East London’s Suffragettes, contributed to exposing the misogyny at the core of local
and national governments that cast women as the source of problems in the area (BBC News,
2014; Belgrave, 2014; Ram, 2014).
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